Guest Post by Anna Read, who is interested in all things city planning, a recent graduate of Cornell School of Art, Architecture, & Planning, and currently working in Washington, D.C.
Jenn asked me to comment on a recent statement made by French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. As part of an ongoing debate, Mr. Sarkozy recently stated: “When I enter a mosque, I take off my shoes. When you enter a public school in France, take off your burka.” Sarkozy, who has a history of expressing anti-Muslim sentiments, said in the same June 2009 speech that the Muslim faith should receive the same respect as other religions, but that he does not see the burka as a symbol of religion. Instead he views it as a symbol of the repression of women. He said it was akin to a prison for women and has no place in modern France: “[Le burqa] ne sera pas la bienvenue sur le territoire de la République” (the burka will not be welcome on the territory of the Republic). The comments have sparked a debate about whether or not the burka should be banned in France.
When you first look at this statement, the logic appears clear. Mr. Sarkozy is saying that he shows respect for the Muslim faith and culture by removing his shoes upon entering a sacred space and he is asking that Muslims respect the secular nature of public schools by removing religious garb when entering them. However, upon closer inspection, there is a critical flaw in Mr. Sarkozy’s logic. A mosque is a religious space, a space that belongs to a religious community, and not a public one. A public school is a public space, and thus subject to a different set of rules. His comments pose and interesting question about the ever-evolving role of public space.
But, before addressing that question, I think it is important to look a bit at the context – both in how we may interpret the comment differently as a result of our cultural norms surrounding religious practice and expression and through the lens of France’s long-standing, largely assimilationist stance regarding immigration (this 2004 RAND explores assimilation and current immigration tensions in both the US and France).
If we are to interpret his statement through an American lens, every citizen is entitled to the right to freely practice their religion (and display that religion by wearing crosses, yarmulkes, burkas, and anything else they see fit to either honor or display their religious beliefs). But what about through a different lens? How does this same comment appear when we look at it within the context of French laws and concepts about freedom of religion and religious practice in public space?
In 2004, France enacted a law banning conspicuous signs of religion in public schools. While the law banned all religious symbols, it was widely interpreted as being directed at the headscarves worn by Muslim girls. The Human Rights Watch entered the debate arguing that it was a violation of religious freedom. The argument behind the ban is that France has a history of strict separation between church and state, a history of being a strictly secular state. Therefore, signs of religious belief (headscarves, burkas, crosses, etc.) should not be worn in state run institutions (schools).
France’s definition of itself as a secular state date back to the 1798 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, in the midst of the French Revolution, and is clearly restated in Title 1, Article 2 (“France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic”) of the current constitution. These documents also address individual liberties and religious freedoms.
The second, fourth, and tenth articles of the Declaration have particular bearing on this debate. The second article states “The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” The question raised here then is whether the French state is oppressing individual freedom and liberty in banning headscarves (and other conspicuous religious symbols) or whether, as Sarkozy argues, the burka is a sign of the oppression of women that grants the state the authority to intervene.
The fourth article states “Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure others; accordingly, the exercise of the rights of each man has no limits except those that secure the enjoyment of these same rights to the other members of society. These limits can be determined only by law.” If wearing a burka can be defined as a religious liberty, it can surely be defined as one that does not injure others. Here, the argument that Mr. Sarkozy’s logic rests on would be that a woman’s liberty is being infringed upon by being forced to wear the burka. It rests very heavily on the assumption of the burka being forced on women by men, rather than a choice a woman makes (this is further discussed a few paragraphs down).
Finally, Article 10 states “No one should be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not upset the public order established by law.” How then, should we view establishing laws that limit the expression of religious belief or opinion?
Article 2 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic also defines the right to religious expression: “It [the Republic] ensures the equality before the law of all citizens, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs.” It can be argued the ban on conspicuous displays of religious symbols in schools treats all religions equally (though, as discussed above, the law was widely seen as being directed at girls wearing headscarves, and has certainly had the most direct bearing on them), but what about a ban on burkas? If Muslim women were required to remove their burkas, would nuns be required to remove their habits? What about Orthodox Jews (Paris has a bustling Jewish Quarter)? Or is the burka unique because it is being defined as a symbol of the oppression of women rather than a symbol of religious belief, expression, and belonging?
Mr. Sarkozy attempted to address this question in his comments as well: “La séparation de l’église et de l’Etat s’est faite dans la douleur, mais sommes-nous obligés de continuer cette guerre qui n’a plus lieu d’être? Nous ne sommes pas menacés par le cléricalisme, nous le sommes davantage par une forme d’intolérance, qui stigmatiserait toute appartenance religieuse” (The separation of church and state was made in sorrow, but are we obligated to continue this war that no longer has a place? We are not threatened by clericalism, we are threatened more by a form of religious intolerance that stigmatizes all religious faiths).
Mr. Sarkozy’s comments raise interesting questions about the difference between public and private space. How do we define these spaces and what are the rules governing them? Is public space a space for giving a voice to marginalized populations? Or for continuing to marginalize them? This then brings us back to the question central to the debate (and Mr. Sarkozy’s comments) – does the burka empower women or does it oppress them (the idea on which Mr. Sarkozy’s argument hinges)? It would seem that much of the answer to this question would depend on whether a woman is wearing the burka by choice or whether she is being forced to wear it. Nicholas Kristof wrote an interesting op-ed in 2001 on the subject of women being forced to wear the burka in Afghanistan. It is not the burka itself that is the problem, he says, but the cultural practices and sentiments behind it. Since Mr. Sarkozy’s comments, women in many Western countries and India have come forward to say that it their choice to wear the burka. For more discussion on this issue, a recent and controversial op-ed in the Sydney Morning Herald.
Religious spaces frequently have customs that are observed upon entering them. Mosques ask that shoes be removed. Catholic churches frequently require women to wear clothing covering both their knees and shoulders. But what are the rules of public space? And is Mr. Sarkozy using this space to empower women oppressed by their religious customs, as he frames his argument, or to oppress an already marginalized religious group?
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